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MONETARY POLICY ON THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS
JÜRGEN VON HAGEN,DECEMBER 2009
THE END OF THE CRISIS IS NIGH
More than two years after the beginning, in August
2007, of the largest financial crisis Europe and the
US have experienced since the late 1920s and just
over one year after this crisis, on 15 September
2008, culminated in the collapse of Lehman
Brothers that almost shattered the global financial
system, the European economy and the economy
of the euro area in particular are gradually coming
out of the recession that stands out as the worst
in the past 50 years. France, Germany, and Italy,
the three largest economies of the euro area have
posted stronger than expected real GDP growth
rates in the last two quarters, indicating that the
recovery is under way. Nevertheless, the recovery
is still weak in the euro area and it is not yet there
in the UK. Banking systems and financial markets
more generally have regained stability, but the
underlying weaknesses in bank balance sheets
persist in several countries.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE CRISIS
The immediate response of monetary policy in
Europe and the US has been an unprecedented
provision of liquidity to the financial institutions
by the central banks. Back in August 2007, the
ECB’s immediate reaction to the emergence of
market strains was to provide ample liquidity.
After the Lehman collapse policy rates, which had
been edging up despite the increasing tensions in
global financial markets until the Fall of 2008 were
quickly reduced from 4.25 percent in July 2008 to
two percent in January and one percent in May
2009, where it continues to stand currently.
Furthermore the ECB’s return to the fixed-rate
tender procedure with full allotment in October
2008 transformed the interest rate on the Bank’s
main refinancing operations from a mid-point to
an effective ceiling for euro-area money market
rates (EONIA), as shown by Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Evolution of ECB Policy Rates and Money
Market Rates (in percent)
Source: ECB
This rapid decline in interest rates was
accompanied by a large expansion of the
Eurosystem’s balance sheet. Figure 2 shows that
it expanded by 39 percent between August and
December 2008. After another peak in June 2009,
it has gradually come down, but still stands at 28
percent above the August 2008 level. Figure 2 also
shows that this rapid expansion was mainly
driven by an increase in loans for monetary and
financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro area, the
share of which in total assets rose from 48
percent in August 2008 to 60 percent in December
2008. Note that other central banks, such as the
US Fed, the Bank of England and the Swedish
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Riksbank, engineered even larger expansions (von
Hagen et al, 2009). 
Figure 2: Expansion of the balance sheet of the
Euro system
Source: ECB
The resulting increase in the supply of central
bank money in the euro area and elsewhere has
left many observers worried about the risks of
rising inflation and further asset market bubbles
it might cause. Clearly, a monetary policy of near-
zero interest rates leaves almost no further room
for standard stimulus policies and is not
sustainable for a long time without creating new
economic instabilities. Looking forward, instead,
the question now is how much of the monetary
expansion will have to be undone in the coming
months. While postponing a return to a more
normal monetary policy risks the building up of a
significant inflation potential, a premature return
risks choking off the economic recovery before it
gains strength and, through higher refinancing
costs for banks, squeezing profit margins that are
needed to rebuild a sufficient capital base in the
banking sector.
During the crisis, some central banks also turned
to so-called unconventional policy measures
including measures of so-called qualitative and
quantitative easing: 
• Unconventional policy measures refer mainly
to finding new channels to provide banks and
even nonbanks with liquidity, when banks are
unable to perform their normal role of suppliers
of credit. They did not aim at substituting
traditional action through the setting of policy
interest rates. Rather, they were intended to
would support and substitute for the normal
operation of interbank markets after these
markets had contracted severely following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers.
• Qualitative easing refers to lowering the
standards of quality the central bank demands
for collateral banks provide when borrowing
from it.
• Quantitative easing refers to the purchase of
assets by the central bank with the aim of
affecting their price. These can be either
Treasury securities or corporate bonds or other
types of securities. In a way, quantitative
easing amounts to a greater emphasis on the
development of monetary aggregates in the
conduct of monetary policy, which may
become necessary when nominal interest
rates approach the lower bound of zero. It has
not played a role in the euro area so far.
The ECB implemented two unconventional
measures during the crisis. First, it lowered the
standards for collateral required in monetary
policy operations in October 2008, thus increasing
the amount of securities banks have available for
obtaining central bank money from the
Eurosystem. Second, it launched a programme for
outright purchases of “covered” bonds in May
2009. Covered bonds are bonds eligible for ECB
monetary policy operations, issued by entities in
the euro area, denominated in euros and held and
settled in the euro area (ECB, 2009). The most
significant aspect of this programme is that it
allows the Eurosystem to buy bonds in the
primary market and thus extend direct credit to
national governments. Although the quantity of
covered bonds purchased under this programme
has remained limited and the programme is set to
expire in 2010, it does mark a serious deviation
from the principle, laid down in the EU Treaty, that
the Eurosystem does not lend directly to the
governments and, if taken as a precedent in the
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future, it could lead to an erosion of the central
bank’s independence from the governments. 
In addition to these measures, the Eurosystem
also implemented three unusual ones. First, Repo
operations since October 2008 have taken the
form of fixed-rate full allotment operations giving
the banks all central bank money they bid for and
the ECB more power to set market rates. Repo
operations also occurred with much greater
frequency than before: 25 main refinancing
operations were conducted between October 15,
2008, and November 4, 2009, compared to 19
between June 28, 2000, and July 9, 2008.
Second, the Eurosystem has offered Repo
operations with maturities of a year the first time
in June 2009, giving banks greater assurance that
policy rates would be low for a considerable period
of time. Third, the ECB has used swap agreements
with partner central banks to provide liquidity in
foreign currencies, ie, US dollars and Swiss francs,
to avoid tensions in foreign exchange markets.
These operations are unusual in the sense of
deviating from pre-crisis normal practices of the
ECB, but not unconventional as they merely
changed the terms of practices adopted before. 
As we will argue in more detail below, these
measures did not cause an extraordinary
expansion of money in the euro area. Since they
remain limited in quantitative terms, they do not
pose important constraints on monetary policy in
the near future in the sense that the ECB would
risk losing control of the money supply.
What is important when thinking about exit
strategies from the current crisis mode of
monetary policy is to realise that policies to
control aggregate liquidity and unconventional or
unusual measures to provide banks with liquidity
through new channels are essentially separable.
The ECB can in fact engage in the latter at any level
of interest rates. As a consequence, these actions
can be thought of mutually independent and the
central bank can exit from either one while
continuing the other one.   
Meanwhile, faced with serious instabilities in the
banking systems and the prospect of an economic
depression, governments in Europe and the US
took action to support the banking systems and
stimulate aggregate demand through large-scale
fiscal expansions. Although the final outcomes in
terms of public debt is not clear yet and depends
on how sustainable the recovery of the banking
sector is, the resulting increase in public debt
levels will burden fiscal policy for years to come.
Stabilising the debt and deficit ratios will be the
first priority of fiscal policy in Europe and the US
in the next five to six years, leaving fiscal policy
with little room to support aggregate demand.
MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE CRISIS
While monetary policy in normal times is
conventionally assessed on the basis of short-
term interest rates, interest rates miss important
aspects of monetary developments during crisis
times. To get a full picture of the situation, it is
important to look at monetary and credit
aggregates as well. This is what we do in this
section.
Figure 3 shows the development of two monetary
aggregates, narrow money (M1) and broad
money (M2) together with the stock of central
bank money, or the monetary base in the euro
area over the past decade. For all three, we set the
March 1999 values equal to 100. The two money
stocks show rather steady tends right up to the
September 2008 crisis. In contrast, monetary
base growth already accelerated during 2007.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the ECB’s monetary base
increased by about 38 percent until the end of
December 2008. It fell by about 13 percent until
the end of April 2009 and then rose again to peak
in June 2009. At the end of September 2009, it
stood at 28 percent above its value in August
2008. Overall, this expansion of the monetary
base is much less dramatic than those in the U
and the UK. As shown by figure 3, the supply of
broad money has remained largely unaffected by
the crisis; in fact, its growth has decelerated. In
contrast, the money stock M1 began to accelerate
as a result of the crisis. If one believes that, overMONETARY POLICY ON THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISISJürgen von Hagen
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the medium term, inflationary pressures result
from excessive broad money growth, the data do
not indicate the building up of an inflationary
potential for the euro area. 
Figure 3: Money stocks and monetary base,
euro area, March 99-Sept 09 (March 99=100)
Source: ECB
How is it possible that the monetary base expands
by so much, while the money supplies remain
unaffected? The answer is in the development of
the money multipliers, which indicate how much
money the banking industry creates out of each
euro supplied by the ECB. Figure 4 shows the
development of the M1 and M2 multipliers (m1
and m2, respectively) for the same time period.
Both started to decline already as the financial
crisis got on its way in August 2007. In the
months following September 2008, they
contracted more strongly and quickly. Thus, the
M2 multiplier fell by about 30 percent between
late August and late December 2008. The
implication is that the broad money stock would
have declined significantly had the ECB not
compensated this development by expanding the
monetary base. Both multipliers increased slightly
in early 2009 and seem to have levelled off since
then. Thus, the financial crisis triggered a process
of financial disintermediation reflected in the
decline of the multipliers. If the multipliers stay at
their new levels for a while, a contraction of the
monetary base would cause the money supplies
to fall with negative consequences for the
economic recovery.
Figure 4: Money multipliers, euro area, March
1999-September 2009 (March 1999=100)
Source: ECB
Figure 5 (overleaf) provides additional infor-
mation about this process. It shows the cash
coefficient in the euro area, ie the ratio of currency
held outside the banking system relative to
demand deposits, and the reserve coefficient, ie,
the amount of reserves monetary and financial
institutions in the euro area hold with the
Eurosystem (including vault cash) relative to
demand deposits. Increases in these coefficients
cause the money multipliers to fall. The cash
coefficient indicates how much cash nonbanks
wish to hold relative to checkable deposits. In a
crisis, this coefficient may increase as people will
withdraw their money from the banks. The figure
suggests that this has not been a major problem in
the current crisis. The reserve coefficient indicates
how much central bank money banks wish to hold
against demand deposits. Since the main
alternative for doing so is lending central bank
money to other banks, an increase in this
‘How is it possible that the monetary base expands by so much, while the money supplies
remain unaffected? The answer is in the development of the money multipliers, which
indicate how much money the banking industry creates out of each euro supplied by the ECB.’
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coefficient signals disturbances in the interbank
market. The huge increase in the reserve
coefficient shows that this was at the heart of the
crisis. This is also indicated by Figure 6, which
shows the ratio of interbank loans in the euro area
to demand deposits. This ratio, which had
increased over most of the last decade, began to
fall during 2007 and contracted strongly after
September 2008. It indicates a strong decline in
the willingness of banks to lend to other banks
and, thus, in the trust banks had in the financial
stability of other banks. As the data show, it is too
early to tell at this point, whether this ratio has
found a new steady-state level. 
Figure 5: Cash and reserves coefficient, euro
area, March 1999-September 2009
Source: ECB
Figure 6: Interbank lending, euro area, March
1999-September 2009 (March 1999=100)
Source: ECB
Finally, Figure 7 shows the volume of bank loans
to nonbanks in the euro area and the
corresponding loan multiplier, the ratio of the
stock of loans to the monetary base. This
multiplier indicates how much credit banks create
out of a euro of central bank money. Similar to the
broad money multiplier, it has declined since the
beginning of the crisis in 2007 and particularly
strongly after September 2008, and may have
levelled off in the last few months. As the figure
indicates, the supply of loans banks have
extended to nonbanks in the euro area has
remained flat since October 2008. Stagnating
credit is not unusual in times of recession, and a
comparison of figures 3 and 7 shows that credit
would actually have contracted without the
expansion of the monetary base implemented by
the ECB.
Figure 7: Bank lending, euro area, March 1999-
September 2009 (March 1999=100)
Source: ECB
The picture for the Euro area emerging from these
figures is markedly different from that in the US
and the UK (von Hagen, 2009), where both the
contraction of the money and loan multipliers and
the expansion of the monetary base have been
much stronger, although the nature of the
problem, the collapse of interbank markets, is the
same1. Judging from this perspective, the finan-
cial crisis seems to have affected the banking
sector in the euro area much less than in the two
other countries. This indicates that the ECB’s much
more moderate reaction in terms of interest rates
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1. In the UK, the process of
disintermediation was
reinforced by an
increase in the cash
coefficient. This can be
attributed to the less
effective deposit
insurance in the UK
before the crisis, which
caused people worried
about their banks to run
on them.MONETARY POLICY ON THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISISJürgen von Hagen
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and balance sheet expansion was indeed justified.
Looking forward, the differences in the extent and
dynamics of the crisis suggest that there is little
scope of and need for international coordination
of exit strategies between the ECB, the Fed, and
the Bank of England.
THE MONETARY EXIT STRATEGY
An important implication of the monetary
developments reviewed in the previous section is
that, although we have witnessed an enormous
expansion of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and
central bank money supply, there is no
commensurate building up of an inflationary
potential in the euro area on the horizon. Due to
the decline in financial intermediation during the
crisis, the expansion of the monetary base has not
been passed through to the monetary aggregates.
This may change eventually, when interbank
markets resume their normal level of activity, but
it is unclear at this point when and how fast this
will happen. The ECB should keep an eye on
monetary developments and interbank activities
and watch their developments carefully.
The recent recovery of economic growth in the
euro area suggests that both monetary and fiscal
policy can return to more normal policies in the
near future. For monetary policy in particular this
would imply a return to higher interest rates and
growth rates of the monetary aggregates in line
with price stability over the medium term. The
main difficulty at the current moment is that a
simultaneous monetary and fiscal contraction
might kill off the recovery before it has acquired
full force. Avoiding this requires some coordination
of monetary and fiscal policy and, first of all, a
choice of which of the two will return to normal,
first (von Hagen, Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker
2009). 
Two considerations arise. First, the long-term
consequences of holding off a return of fiscal
policy to normal seem much larger than the long-
term consequences of letting fiscal policy exit
from crisis mode first and delaying the exit of
monetary policy for a while. The reason is that
delaying the necessary fiscal consolidation would
result in even larger debt burdens and,
consequently larger needs to raise taxes or cut
expenditures in order to service these debts. This,
in turn, could prevent the euro area economy from
returning to normal potential output growth rates
for a longer time. Second, monetary policy can be
adjusted with greater speed and flexibility to any
unforeseen developments on the way out of the
crisis, such as an unexpected increase in inflation.
The risk of adverse macroeconomic developments,
therefore, seems considerably less if fiscal policy
exits from crisis mode first and monetary policy
second.   
If fiscal policy is given priority, monetary policy
should remained geared at price stability and
would normalise once justified by expected price
developments2. Against the background of weak
public demand and possibly weak global demand,
however, this may be a rather long process. Policy
interest rates may have to remain low for an
extended period and, depending on how fast
financial intermediation resumes, unconventional
initiatives may have to remain part of the central
bankers’ toolkit. 
From the point of view of central banks, this is a
rather uncomfortable perspective for two reasons.
First, they also have an understandable appetite
for a return to normality, not least because they
fear that being unconventional for too long might
undermine the public commitment to price stab-
ility. Second, they may rightly fear that a low
interest rate environment would soon recreate the
conditions that contributed to the financial ex-
cesses of the early 2000s. Already, signs have
emerged pointing in this direction. They call for a
swift and thorough implementation of the regu-
latory reforms prepared at G20 level and by the
‘There has been an enormous expansion of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and central bank
money supply, but no commensurate build up of an inflationary potential in the euro area.’
2.In this process of
normalisation, central
banks should continue their
past practice of focusing on
second round effects of
increases in world market
prices of raw materials and
agricultural produce if and
when they arise as the
global economy starts to
pick up again.MONETARY POLICY ON THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISISJürgen von Hagen
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global regulatory agencies (notably the FSB and
the BCBS) and for speeding up the creation of the
European Systemic Risk Board and preparation for
a fully worked-out macroprudential policy frame-
work. Macroprudential oversight was initially
regarded as a medium-term objective destined to
prevent future crises after the memory of this one
faded away. It may be needed earlier.  
In the past, the ECB has objected to any form of
ex-ante coordination between monetary and fiscal
policy, fearing that it could undermine its
independence and its mandate for price stability.
We do not recommend here, however, that the ECB
should engage in coordinated, macro economic
fine-tuning together with the fiscal authorities. At
this point, coordinating the exit strategies requires
that the governments and the ECB inform each
other clearly about their intended policies and that
one takes into account the plans of the other. In
particular, the ECB should be very clear about its
views of the situation and explain to the
governments the conditions under which it would
hold interest rates low and the conditions under
which it would think that higher interest rates
would be more appropriate.
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